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A binary game is introduced and anal-
ysed. N players have to choose one of the
two sides independently and those on the
minority side win. Players uses a finite set
of ad hoc strategies to make their decision,
based on the past record. The analysing
power is limited and can adapt when nec-
essary. Interesting cooperation and compe-
tition pattern of the society seem to arise
and to be responsive to the payoff function.
Most current economics theories are de-
ductive in origin. One assumes that each
participant knows what is best for him
given that all other participants are equally
intelligent in choosing their best actions.
However, it is recently realised that in the
real world the actual players do not have
the perfect foresight and hindsight, most
often their actions are based on trial–and–
error inductive thinking, rather than the
deductive rationale assuming that there are
underlying first principles. Whether de-
ductive or inductive thinking is more rel-
evant is still under debate [1].
Evolutionary games have also been stud-
ied within the standard framework of game
theory [2]. However it is recently pointed
out that the approach traditionally used in
economics is not convenient to generalise
to include irrationality, and an alternative
langevin type equation is proposed [3]. As
physicists we would like to view a game
with a large number of players a statis-
tical system, we need to explore new ap-
proaches in which emerging collective phe-
nomena can be better appreciated. One
recent approach using bounded rationality
is particularly inspiring, put forward by B.
Arthur in his El Farol bar problem [4]. Fol-
lowing the similar philosophy, in this work
we propose and study a simple evolution-
ary game.
Let us consider a population of N (odd)
players, each has some finite number of
strategies S. At each time step, everybody
has to choose to be in side A or side B. The
payoff of the game is to declare that after
everybody has chosen side independently,
those who are in the minority side win. In
the simpliest version, all winners collect a
point. The players make decisions based on
the common knowledge of the past record.
We further limit the record to contain only
yes and no e.g. the side A is the winning
side or not, without the actual attendance
number. Thus the system’s signal can be
represented by a binary sequence, meaning
A is the winning side (1) or not (0).
Let us assume that our players are quite
limited in their analysing power, they can
only retain last M bits of the system’s sig-
nal and make their next decision basing
only on these M bits. Each player has a
finite set of strategies. A strategy is de-
fined to be the next action (to be in A or
B) given a specific signal’s M bits. The ex-
ample of one strategy is illustrated in table
1 for M=3.
signal prediction
000 1
001 0
010 0
011 1
100 1
101 0
110 1
111 0
There are 8 (= 2M ) bits we can assign
to the right side, each configuration corre-
sponds a distinct strategy, this makes the
total number of strategy to be 22
M
= 256.
This is indeed a fast increasing number,
for M = 2, 3, 4, 5 it is 16, 256, 65536,
655362. We randomly draw S strategies
for each player, and some strategies maybe
by chance shared. However for moderately
large M , the chance of repetition of a sin-
gle strategy is exceedingly small. Another
special case is to have all 1’s (or 0’s) on
the RHS of the table, corresponding to the
fixed strategy of staying at one side no mat-
ter what happens.
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Let us analyse the structure of this Mi-
nority’s game to see what to expect. Con-
sider the extreme case where only one
player takes a side, all the others take the
other. The lucky player gets a reward
point, nothing for the others. Equally ex-
treme example is that when (N−1)/2 play-
ers in one side, (N + 1)/2 on the other.
From the society point of view, the second
situation is preferable since the whole pop-
ulation gets (N−1)/2 points whereas in the
first example only one point—a huge waste.
Perfect coordination and timing would ap-
proach the 2nd, disaster would be the first
example. In general we expect the pop-
ulation to behave between the above two
extremes.
This binary game can be easily simu-
lated for a large population of players. Ini-
tially, each player draws randomly one out
of his S strategies and use it to predict next
step, an artificial signal of M bits is also
given. All the S strategies in a player’s bag
can collect points depending if they would
win or not given the M past bits, and the
actual outcome of the next play. However,
these points are only virtual points as they
record the merit of a strategy as if it were
used each time. The player uses the strat-
egy having the highest accumulated points
(capital) for his action, he gets a real point
only if the strategy used happens to win in
the next play.
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FIG. 1. Actual number of attendance at
the side A against time, for a population of
1001 players, having brain size of 6, 8 and
10 bits (a),(b),(c)
In Figs. 1 we plot the actual number of
attendance at the side A, for a popula-
tion of 1001 players, having various brain
sizes (i.e. M bits). As one may expect,
that the temporal signal indeed fluctuates
around the 50 %. Whoever takes the side
A wins a point at a given time step when
the signal is below 501. The precise num-
ber is not known to the players, they only
know if a side is winning or not, after their
bet is made. Note that large fluctuations
imply large waste since still more players
could have taken the winning side with-
out harm done to the others. On the other
hand, smaller fluctuations imply more effi-
cient usage of available resources, in gen-
eral this would require coordination and
cooperation — which are not built-in ex-
plicitly. We see that the population hav-
ing larger brains (i.e. M larger) cope with
each other better : the fluctuation are in-
deed in decreasing order for ever increas-
ingly ”intelligent” players (i.e. M = 6, 8,
10). Remarkable is that each player is by
definition selfish, not considerate to fellow
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players, yet somehow they manage to bet-
ter somewhat share the limited available
resources.
Let us remark that the very simplest
strategy by playing randomly is not in-
cluded here, for generating random num-
bers more bits are needed. In a perfect
timing, the average gain in the population
would be 1/2 per play. Waste is propor-
tional to fluctuation’s amplitude hence the
average gain is always below 1/2 in reality.
Since the game is symmetrical in A and
B, one may be tempted to use the simple
strategy to stay at A or B, hoping to get
exactly 1/2 gain. Let us mention if this
strategy indeed rewards 1/2 gain on aver-
age, many would imitate. Let us say there
is a group sitting at A no matter what sig-
nal is shown (this is included in the strat-
egy space). The active players will soon
recognise that they win less often choosing
A than B. In fact, for them the game is
no longer symmetrical and they will adopt
accordingly so that the apparent advan-
tage disappears for those sitting at one side
fixed. This is similar to the arbitrage op-
portunities in finance: any obvious advan-
tage will be arbitraged away — no easy
“risk-free way” to make a living both for
our players and those in the real world.
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FIG. 2. Success rate of a mixed
population players against their memory
(N = 1001, S = 5)
The advantage of the larger brain sizes
over the smaller ones can be better appre-
ciated inspecting Fig. 2. Identical param-
eters (N = 1001, S = 5) for a mixed pop-
ulation having M = 1, · · · , 10. We thus
force unequally equiped players to play to-
gether. One may fear that the ”poorly”
brained players may get exploited by the
more powerfully brained ones. Indeed this
is the case. We plot the average gain per
time step after a long time. We see that
within a sub-population (same M) there
are better and worse performers. We have
noticed that better players do not neces-
sarily stay that way for a long time, but
exceptions exist. For M = 1, there ap-
pears fewer points, since there are more
degeneracies. As a group the more intel-
ligent players gain more and the spread
between the rich and the poor is smaller,
even though the in-fighting among them is
more intensified. Remark that above a cer-
tain size (M ≈ 6) the average performance
of a population appears to saturate, fur-
ther increasing the brain size does not seem
to improve more. This is due to the sim-
ple structure of this version of the game,
there is nothing more to gain. Recall that
only most crude information is transmit-
ted to the players, i.e. only yes and no,
not the exact attendance number. More
precise information would necessitate more
analysing power, more complicated payoff
functions and games also provides incen-
tives to develop more sophisticated brains.
However in the present work, we stick to
the binary functions and will report more
complicated applications using neural net-
works elsewhere.
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FIG. 3. Histograph of the attendance of
A (N = 1001, M = 8, S = 5)
Of course the game is symmetrical for
A and B. This can be observed in Fig. 3,
where the histograph shows the attendance
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of A (hence B is the mirror image at the
point N = 501). B. Arthur’s El Farol prob-
lem uses 60% rule and does not rise new
questions and results appear to be similar.
One may argue that our payoff function
is too simple, i.e. a step function with-
out differentiating a “good” minority from
a “bad” one. Let us consider the payoff
function N/x − 2, i.e. these many (near-
est integer values) points awarded to ev-
ery player choosing the minority side, the
number of winning players being x < N/2.
Clearly this structure favours smaller mi-
nority. This is like in lottery you would
like to be on the winning side, but even
better you are alone there. The players
thus face an extra type of competition, a
winner would prefer less fellow winners in
company. If for instance a player wins
on a mediocre play, his winning strategies
are hardly enhanced with respect to not
winning at all. Globally the population
(N = 1001, M = 4) respond to having
a histograph Fig. 4 with two peaks. Al-
though the jackpot (winning alone) is very
appealing, this is very unlikely to happen
since the fellow players are just as intel-
ligent. The players need a sizeable gain
to get motivation to win. The appears to
be a compromise that they effectively (not
through any enforceable agreement) agree
to show up on the minority side a smaller
number of players. What is remarkable
here is that entropy, i.e. the most likely
configuration, does not favour the Fig 4.
distribution. The players manage to defy
entropy, in other words to get themselves
organised to occupy less unlikely configu-
rations.
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FIG. 4. Histograph of the attendance of
A for a N/x− 2 payoff (N = 1001, M = 4,
S = 5)
One may inquire what happens if the
players are provided with a bigger “idea
bag” with more alternative strategies. In
Fig. 5 we show the results for various
populations (N=1001, M = 5) with S =
2, 3, · · · , 9. We see that in general with
increasing number of alternatives the play-
ers tend to perform worse. What happens
is that the players tend to switch strate-
gies oftener and more likely to get “con-
fused”, i.e. some outperforming strategy
may distract the player’s attention, after
being chosen turns out to be underper-
forming. We recognise that this has also
to do with the observation time, currently
a player switches immediately if another
strategy has one virtual point more than
that in use. If a higher threshold is set,
then the hinderance by increasing number
of alternatives can be in part avoided. In
the neural network version of our game,
just one network (with adjustable weights)
is given to a player. Let us recall that
in a recent study, Borkar et al [5] have
proven that in an evolutionary game play-
ers tend to specialise in a single strategy,
even though alternatives exist.
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FIG. 5. Success rate of the best, worst
and average players against the number of
strategies (N = 1001, M = 5)
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FIG. 6. Switching rate against the suc-
ces rate for various populations
In Fig. 6 we plot the switching rate
against the succes rate for various pop-
ulations. The general tendance that the
oftener one switches, less successful one
would end up. The phase space seems to be
highly fragmented and many substructures
appear, attributable to the binary nature
of our game.
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FIG. 7. Performance record of the 3
best, the 3 worse and 3 randomly chosen
players (N = 1001, M = 10, S = 5)
It is also instructive to follow the per-
formance record. In Fig 7., we select 3
top players, 3 bottom players and 3 ran-
domly chosen players. They are chosen at
the last time step and we trace back their
past record. Their capital gains are scaled
such that the average gain (over the pop-
ulation) appears in an almost horizontal
line. We see that the general tendance for
the best and worst players are rather con-
sistent even though setbacks for the best
and bursts for the worst do occur. No-
tice that the gap between the rich and the
poor appears to increase linearly with time,
though reversion is possible but the poor
players in general are doomed to stay poor.
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FIG. 8. Different distributions of the av-
erage value of all the strategies with in-
creasing iterations numbers (1000, 5000
and 10000), showing that all strategies are
equivalent in the t →∞ limit
Another result enhances this conclusion
: one may blame bad players for their bad
strategies. In order to check whether there
are really good and bad strategies, we plot
the virtual gains of all the strategies in the
population. In Fig 8 we see three different
distributions of the average (time) gains.
The longer the time the more concentrate
is the distribution, indicating that relative
values of the strategies are about the same.
Indeed it can be analyticaly shown that all
the strategies are equivalent to each other,
since our game is symmetrical in A and
B. So the bad player are bad because they
have used the strategies inopportunely and
are unlucky, also their specific composition
is to blame. Note that a player is only dis-
tinguished from others by this composition,
if two players having the same composition,
they are clone sisters. In that case initial
conditions can still set them apart and they
may know different fortunes only in the be-
ginning.
The above discussion calls for a genetic
approach in which the poor players are reg-
ulary weeded out from the game and new
players are introduced to replace the elim-
inated ones. This genetic approach is al-
ready applied to a prototype model [6] for
stock or currency trading, mimicking what
happens in the real market. Let us consider
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our minority game generalized to include
the Darwinist selection : the worst player
is replaced by a new one after some time
steps, the new player is a clone of the best
player, i.e. it inherits all the strategies but
with corresponding virtual capitals reset to
zero. This is analogous to a new born baby,
though having all the predispositions from
the parents, does not inherit their knowl-
edge.
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FIG. 9. Temporal attendance of A for
the genetic approach showing a learning
process
To keep a certain diversity we introduce
a mutation possibility in cloning. We al-
low one of the strategies of the best player
to be replaced by a new one. Since strate-
gies are not just recycled among the players
any more, the whole strategy phase space
is available for selection. We expect this
population is capable of “learning” since
self-destructive, obviously bad players are
weeded out with time, fighting is among so-
to-speak the best players. Indeed in Fig 9
we observe that the learning has emerged
in time. Fluctuations are reduced and sat-
urated, this implies the average gain for
everybody is improved but never reaches
the ideal limit. What would happen if no
mutation is allowed and cloning is perfect?
Eventually population is full of the clone
copies of the best player, each may still dif-
fer in their decision since the virtual cap-
itals in their idea-bag can be different. In
Fig. 10 we plot the performance of such a
“pure” population, there appears tremen-
dous waste and all strange things go loose.
Indeed, the results from inbreeding look
rather incestous.
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FIG. 10. Temporal attendance of A of
an “pure” population
As the last experiment we start the pop-
ulation very “simple-minded”, say M = 2.
We allow in the cloning process mentionned
above an additional feature that a bit of
memory can be added or substracted for
the cloned new player, with a small prob-
ability. We want to be sure that the rules
are such that this structural mutation is
strictly neutral, i.e does not favour bigger
brains over the smaller ones, we leave that
to the invisible hand of evolution to decide.
Indeed something remarkable takes place:
in Fig. 11 we plot the average brain size
in the population started with M = 2, for
a population of N = 101 and N = 1001.
The temporal record shows that there is
an “arm race” among the players. We
know by now that the more brain power
leads to advantage, so in the evolution of
survival-of-the-fittest the players develop
bigger brains to cope with ever aggressive
fellow-players. However such an evolution
appear to saturate and the “arm race” to
settle at a given level. The saturation val-
ues are not universal, having to do with
the time intervals of reproduction. In gen-
eral the larger brains need longer time to
learn. Larger population (N = 1001) needs
more powerful brains to sustain the appar-
ent equilibrium than the smaller popula-
tion (N = 1001), also the learning rate (the
slope in Fig.11) is smaller. We mention
en passant that population’s brain sizes do
not concentrate on one value, only aver-
age value is plotted. Some players manage
to make do quite happily with a relatively
small brains.
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FIG. 11. Temporal record of the mem-
ory average of a starting from M = 2 pop-
ulation for N = 101 (a) and N = 1001 (b)
(S = 5)
Conclusions. What can we learn from
these simple numerical experiments? First
of all the economical behavior in the real
world seems to call for a general approach
to systematically study the evolutionary
nature of games. There are a few most rel-
evant questions to address: 1) given each
agent’s selfishness what is his cooperative
and cognitive skills in the course of compe-
tition ? 2) What is the emerging collective
behavior that is the society’s performance
without an enforceable authority ? 3) How
can our visible hand modify the rules of the
game (payoff functions) such that global re-
sponse may appear more cooperative ? 4)
How does evolution puts its invisible hand
to work? Clearly our study is just a be-
ginning to answer all these. What we have
presented in this work is not just an over-
simplied model, but a general approach to
ask the right questions. This approach, as
the reader can readily convince himself, is
very open to all sorts of variation. It is
easy to include other situation-motivated
payoff functions and game structures, there
are qualitatively new questions to be asked
when more realistic games are studied. It
is a theoretical physicist’s dream to have
an Ising type model, though oversimplified,
and yet to capture some essential points of
the real world. Our minority game may be
indeed the simplest of the kind.
Our model is by design without fun-
damentals and insider information. Play-
ers are forced to fight each other. With
the Darwinism included, everyone has to
keep improving in order to survive—the red
queen effect. Unlike some examples in stan-
dard game theory, there is no commonly
accepted optimal strategy (analogous to
physical systems without obvious ground
states). A rational approach is helpless
here. Yet the emerging society appears to
have a certain organisation. Even though
the players care only their own gain, co-
operation and timing does seem to sponta-
neously arise. Note that our learning mech-
anism is different from the traditional neu-
ral network studies, where a pre-assigned
task like a pattern is given and performance
is measured on how precise the original is
restored. Here the task is self-appointed
and no ending is defined.
We may even speak of the emergence
of intelligence. If the analysing power of
the players can be adapted to the increas-
ingly challenging task (survival amongst
ever aggressive fellow players and larger
number of players), the populations seem
to evolve more equipped, larger brains ap-
pear to dominate and available resources
are better exploited, i.e. less fluctuation
and waste in attendance number. This is
not unsimilar to the study of the prebi-
otic evolution: in the promodial soup only
very simple organisms exist. Evolution al-
lows these organisms to add one new fea-
ture (or reduce an existing one) from time
to time. More complex organisms tend to
cope with the survival task better and more
and more refined organisms spontaneously
appear out of the monotonous soup [7].
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